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NOTES
Usurping the Executive Power: State Board of Ethics for
Elected Officials v. Green
I. INTRODUCTION
State Board of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green' presented two
main issues to the Louisiana Supreme Court: (1) Is it constitutional for
the legislature to appoint members to boards and commissions within
the executive branch of government, and (2) If so, can such a board
or commission constitutionally exercise civil enforcement powers?
On first hearing, the court answered the first question affirmatively.
The power of appointment under the state constitution does not exclu-
sively belong to the governor, the court found. The second question,
however, the court answered 'negatively. Once these legislatively-ap-
pointed officials are given authority to exercise functions that belong
exclusively to the executive branch, such as filing civil proceedings, a
violation of the separation of powers provision of the Louisiana Con-
stitution occurs.
That opinion-a four-three split opinion-was reconsidered, and a
rehearing was granted four months later. On rehearing, 2 the court main-
tained its position on the appointments issue, but changed its opinion
on the constitutionality of a legislatively-appointed board or commission's
civil enforcement powers. The court held that the mere fact that the
legislature has appointed the board's members does not violate the
principle of separation of powers, as long as (1) the appointment of
the members by the legislature was otherwise valid constitutionally; and
(2) the appointees are not subject to such significant legislative control
that the legislature can be deemed to be performing executive functions
through its control of the members of the board in the executive branch.'
Second rehearing was denied. 4c
The Green trio involved a challenge to the constitutionality of civil
enforcement power given to the Board of Ethics,: an executive branch
Copyright 1991, by LOUISImNA LAW REvmw.
1. 540 So. 2d 1185 (La. App. 1st Cir.) (Green 1), aff'd, 545 So. 2d 1031 (1989)
(Green II), affd on reh'g in part, rev'd in part, 566 So. 2d 623 (1990) (Green III).
2. Green III, 566 So. 2d 623.
3. Id. at 624.
4. Id. at 623. Second rehearing was denied Sept. 27, 1990.
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board, primarily legislatively-appointed and acting as the Supervisory
Committee on Campaign Finance Disclosure ("the Committee"). This
casenote reviews the historical background of the Committee, how this
case arose, and the statutory provisions at issue. Discussion of the two
main issues and analysis of the supreme court's first opinion and the
opinion issued on rehearing follows. This note concludes with an analysis
of the status of Green in light of the close vote and the change in
composition of the court.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE
A. History of the Committee
The stated purpose of the Election Campaign Finance Disclosure
Act' (the "Act") is "to provide public disclosure of the financing of
election campaigns and to regulate certain campaign practices." ' 6 Gen-
erally, the Act provides for reporting contributions and expenditures
involved in campaigns for elective state and local public offices, prohibits
and limits certain practices, and provides for civil and criminal penalties.
It also establishes the Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance
Disclosure.
The initial legislation 7 created three supervisory committees: one for
candidates for the Senate,' one for candidates for the House of Rep-
resentatives, 9 and one for other candidates and persons also required to
file reports. 0 In 1976, the legislature replaced the three committees with
one committee." In 1980, the legislature changed the membership12 and
also gave the committee authority to enforce civil penalties by filing
5. The Act, enacted as 1975 La. Acts No. 718, § 1, has been amended several
times: 1976 La. Acts No. 386, § 1; 1978 La. Acts No. 137, § 1; 1980 La. Acts No. 786,
§ 1; 1981 La. Acts Nos. 59, § 1 and 716, § 1; 1982 La. Acts Nos. 266, § 1 and 652,
§ 1; 1984 La. Acts Nos. 466, § I and 492, § 1; 1986 La. Acts No. 669, § 1; and 1987
La. Acts Nos. 722, § 1; 831, § 1, and 757, § 1.
6. La. R.S. 18:1482 (Supp. 1990).
7. 1975 La. Acts No. 718, § 1.
8. Composed of the secretary of the Senate, the legislative auditor, and the executive
director of the Legislative Council.
9. Composed of the clerk of the House, the legislative auditor, and the executive
director of the Legislative Council.
10. Composed of the secretary of the Senate, the clerk of the House, the legislative
auditor, and the executive director of the Legislative Council.
11. 1976 La. Acts No. 386, § 1. The committees were replaced with one Supervisory
Committee, composed of the secretary of the Senate, the clerk of the House, the legislative
auditor, and the executive director of the Louisiana Legislative Council.
12. 1980 La. Acts No. 786, § 1. The membership was changed to the secretary of
the Senate, the clerk of the House, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.
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civil proceedings. It was in 1981 that the legislature provided that the
Board of Ethics for Elected Officials 3 would be the administrative and
enforcement body for the Act.
The Board of Ethics is a part of the executive branch of state
government, being placed in the Department of Civil Service, and is
composed of five persons: one appointed by the governor,' 4 two chosen
by the House of Representatives, and two chosen by the Senate. Thus,
legislative appointees compose eighty percent of the Board.
B. How This Case Arose
After conducting an investigation pursuant to the provisions of the
Act, the Board of Ethics for Elected Officials, acting as the Committee,
filed an action against various defendants alleging violations of the Act 5
and seeking to impose penalties.' 6 The Board also filed interrogatories
and requests for production of documents, noticed the taking of dep-
ositions, and issued subpoenas. '7
Various defendants filed motions for protective orders from all
discovery, arguing that the Board could not constitutionally proceed
because the statute by which it had authority to act, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 18:1511.5(A), violates article II, sections 1 and 2 and article
IV, section 5(A) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
III. TM CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Appointments Clause and Jurisprudence
The Louisiana State Constitution provides:
The Governor shall appoint, subject to confirmation by the
Senate, the head of each department in the executive branch
whose election or appointment is not provided by this consti-
tution and the members of each board and commission in the
13. La. R.S. 42:1132 (1990). The name also was changed from "Supervisory Com-
mittee, Campaign Finance Disclosure Act" to "Supervisory Committee on Campaign
Finance Disclosure."
14. The gubernatorial appointee must be a retired or former Louisiana Supreme Court
justice, court of appeal judge, or district court judge. Id.
15. The petition alleged the defendants should be found to have "knowingly and
willfully made loans through or in the name of another to the Doug Green Campaign
Committee, Inc.," in violation of La. R.S. 18:1505.2(A) (Supp. 1990); and "knowingly
and willfully inaccurately disclosed the source of the loans," in violation of La. R.S.
18:1505.1(C) (Supp. 1990).
16. Pursuant to La. R.S. 18:1505.5, :1505.1(C) and :1505.4(A)(2) (Supp. 1990).
17. The question of whether these actions could be taken while the state pursued a
criminal investigation of Green was not at issue.
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executive branch whose election or appointment is not provided
by this constitution or by law. 8
This provision can be compared with the United States Constitution
which vests exclusive authority to appoint executive branch officials in
the President, except for enumerated instances. Article II, section 2,
clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law: but the Congress may by law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Court of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 9
The federal appointment process is a practical function of the doc-
trine of separation of powers: Congress establishes federal offices, and
the President, subject to Senate confirmation, chooses the officers3 °
In Green I, the first circuit faced the question of whether the
Louisiana provision allowed the legislature to make appointments to
executive branch boards or commissions without infringing on the gov-
ernor's appointment powers. The supreme court, in Green II and Green
III, affirmed the analysis of the first circuit on this issue. Finding that
the Louisiana Constitution did not disallow legislative appointment to
executive branch boards, the first circuit stated:
Plaintiff's argument that the appointments clause limits the gov-
ernor to appointing only officials exercising executive powers is
based upon a misconception of the nature of our state Consti-
tution. The federal Constitution is a document of "enumerated
powers" (Amendment X, U.S. Const.). The Louisiana Consti-
tution is different. Complete legislative power, except as limited
by the Constitution, lies within the state legislature.2'
Thus, the courts found the appointments clause does not limit the
power of the legislature to enact statutes providing for legislative ap-
pointments to executive branch boards or commissions, unless the sep-
aration of powers doctrine is violated.
18. La. Const. art. IV, § 5(H) (emphasis added).
19. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The rest of this clause concerns the treaty-making
process.
20. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law § 7.11, at 249 (3d ed.
1986).
21. State Bd. of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green, 540 So. 2d 1185, 1192 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), aff'd, 545 So. 2d 1031 (1989), aff'd on reh'g in part, rev'd in part, 566
So. 2d 623 (1990).
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The first circuit's interpretation of the Louisiana constitutional pro-
vision, in comparison with the federal constitutional provision, appears
to be supported by textual authority. The Louisiana provision explicitly
says appointments may be made by the governor that are not reserved
by the constitution "or by law." The legislature explicitly provided for
the appointment of the members of the Committee. Thus, as long as
no other constitutional provision was violated, the appointments were
valid. This was the interpretation of the first circuit, 22 which the supreme
court affirmed. 23
B. Separation of Powers
The second question in Green, however, was not decided so sum-
marily. Even though the appointment of the members to the Committee
was found valid, its powers still could be unconstitutional if violative
of the doctrine of the separation of powers.
Article II, section 1 of the Louisiana Constitution provides that
"the powers of government of the state are divided into three separate
branches: legislative, executive and judicial." Article II, section 2 pro-
vides, "Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of
these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall
exercise power belonging to either of the others."
Article IV, section 5 defines the powers and duties of the governor.
Section 5(A) provides, "The governor shall be the chief executive officer
of the state. He shall faithfully support the constitution and laws of
the state and of the United States and shall see that the laws are
faithfully executed."
Thus, under the constitutional scheme, the legislature makes the
laws, the executive branch enforces the laws and the judiciary interprets
the laws. The principle of separation of powers has been traced back
to Cicero, Aristotle, Locke, and Montesquieu.24 The underlying policies
of division of power are to guarantee the liberty of the people and to
prevent the exercise of autocratic power,2 as well as to provide for
checks and balances within the governmental structure.
Theoretically, the tripartite scheme is one of the most important
principles in government,2 but in application it has never been interpreted
strictly at the federal or the state levels because of the impracticality
and practical impossibility of delineating distinct lines between different
22. 540 So. 2d 1185.
23. 566 So. 2d 623.
24. 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law § 294 (2d ed. 1979).




branches of government. 27 Some overlapping and blending of powers is
inevitable.
State cases recognize some blending, such as inherent powers of the
judiciary2" and limited regulatory powers of agencies. 29 However, when
a conflict has arisen in which the judiciary or executive branches treads
upon the powers of the legislature, the court has read the state con-
stitution provision fairly strictly, keeping the power of the legislature
to make laws within the legislature.30
Green, however, presented a situation in which the legislature was
usurping the executive power to enforce the law. The Board of Ethics
is eighty percent legislatively appointed, but when functioning in its
capacity as the Committee has authority to enforce the laws, which is
an executive branch function.3
In Guidry v. Roberts,2 a case similar to Green, the Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Campaign Finance
Disclosure Act. At that time, however, the Committee did not have
enforcement powers. The issue in Guidry, as in Green, was whether the
functions and powers entrusted to the legislatively-appointed Committee
violated any power exclusively vested in the executive branch, particularly
the duty to "see that the laws are faithfully executed." 33 In upholding
the constitutionality of the Act, the Guidry court stated:
The powers granted these legislatively appointed instrumentalities
• . . pertain only to receipt, dissemination, and investigation of
reports, and to referral of them to appropriate prosecutorial
officers-governmental activities which neither historically nor
functionally fall within the exclusive power of the executive
branch to "see that the laws are faithfully executed.... -34
The court in Guidry both relied on and distinguished Buckley v.
Valeo,35 the United States Supreme Court decision which addressed the
constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act. That Act pro-
vided for a commission composed of legislatively-appointed officials with
the power to file civil suits for violations. The Buckley court held:
27. Id. at § 297.
28. Konrad v. Jefferson Parish Council, 520 So. 2d 393 (La. 1988); State In re
Johnson, 475 So. 2d 340 (La. 1985).
29. State v. Barthelemy, 545 So. 2d 531 (La. 1989); State v. Taylor, 479 So. 2d 339
(La. 1985).
30. Commissioner of Agriculture v. Plaquemines Parish Comm. Council, 439 So. 2d
348 (La. 1983); State v. Broom, 439 So. 2d 357 (La. 1983).
31. Guidry v. Roberts, 335 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
32. Id.
33. La. Const. art. IV, § 5(A); 335 So. 2d at 444.
34. Guidry, 335 So. 2d at 446 (emphasis in original).
35. 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976).
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Insofar as the powers confided in the Commission are essentially
of an investigative and informative nature, falling in the same
general category as those powers which Congress might delegate
to one of its own committees, there can be no question that
the Commission as presently constituted may exercise them....
But when We go beyond this type of authority to the more
substantial powers exercised by the Commission, we reach a
different result. The Commission's enforcement power to seek
judicial relief, is authority that cannot possibly be regarded as
merely in aid of the legislative function of Congress. A lawsuit
is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the
President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts
the responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed. "36
The court in Guidry distinguished on the fact that it was the en-
forcement power-the power to institute civil actions-that was the
unconstitutional infirmity in Buckley. At the time, the Committee had
no such power .7
In 1980, however, the legislature provided this enforcement power.
In response to an inquiry from the Secretary of State, Attorney General
William Guste issued an opinion:
[u]nder the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in Guidry and
the United States Supreme Court case of Buckley v. Valeo ...
it is clear that the granting of the power to institute civil actions
in the Supervisory Committee is a violation of the separation
of powers provision of the Louisiana Constitution.38
The court again addressed the separation of powers issue in 1977,
one year after Guidry. In Guste v. Legislative Budget Committee,39 the
court held that exercise by the governor of his right to appoint twenty-
four of twenty-eight members of the Legislative Budget Committee "does
not make laws, nor does it so influence the law-making process that
there is an indirect invasion of the legislative process." 4 The court
noted, however, that Buckley would invalidate a statute creating a com-
mittee to perform functions exclusively executive when the legislature
named the members of the committee. 4 ' In 1981, the legislature changed
36. Id. at 137, 96 S. Ct. at 691.
37. Guidry, 335 So. 2d at 446 (majority opinion by Tate, J.).
38. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-1384, 79 (Jan. 23, 1981).
39. 347 So. 2d 160 (La. 1977).
40. Id. at 165.
41. Id. at 164 n.5. "The principle of Buckley v. Valeo would invalidate a statute
creating a committee to perform functions exclusively executive when the legislature named
the members of the committee .... Id.
19911
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the composition of the Committee to its present form, but left intact
the power to institute civil actions. 4
In Green II, the supreme court stated that the authority to institute
civil proceedings rendered that part of the Act unconstitutional. On
rehearing, the court stated:
On reconsideration we take a different approach and reach a
different result .... The mere fact that the Legislature has ap-
pointed the board's members does not violate separation of
power principles, as long as (1) the appointment of the members
by the Legislature was constitutionally valid and (2) the ap-
pointees are not subject to such significant legislative control
that the Legislature can be deemed to be performing executive
functions through its control of the members of the board in
the executive branch.43
The first question, the court said, was answered affirmatively in the
original opinion. The key focus of the constitutional determination under
Green Il's different approach, the court stated, is to examine "the
degree of control over the appointees.""
The court reviewed what it called "significant restraints on legislative
control over actions of the Board. ' 45 There was no continuing rela-
tionship, it noted, between the legislature and the appointees in any
significant degree beyond the original appointment." The court also
stated:
Of course, the fact of original appointment may suggest the
existence of some influence by the Legislature over the appoint-
ees, but even this possibility of control is dissipated by the
spreading of the appointive powers among the Governor, the
Senate and the House of Representatives. 47
Thus, the court concluded, the state constitution was not infringed
upon by the legislature exercising power belonging to the executive branch
and "the equilibrium sought to be established by the constitutional
allocation of power among the branches" was not significantly unbal-
anced.4
42. 1981 La. Acts No. 59, § 1; La. R.S. 18:1511.1, :1511.5 (Supp. 1990).
43. State Bd. of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green, 566 So. 2d 623, 624 (La.
1990).
44. Id. at 625.
45. Id. La. R.S. 42:1132 (1990) provides that members of the Board are appointed
for staggered six-year terms and can be removed only for cause; legislators, employees
of the Legislature, and other public servants cannot be appointed; the Board's staff
members are classified as civil servants.
46. 566 So. 2d at 625.




IV. STRENGTH AND VALUE OF THE OPINION
The final opinion may be challenged in several ways: (1) little
authority supports the conclusion; (2) the changing of results with a
change in the composition of the court weakens its value as a pro-
nouncement of the court's position on this issue; (3) the reasoning in
the opinion is imprecise and the language is vague; and (4) a major
premise stated in the opinion is unrealistic.
The first circuit and the supreme court on first hearing found that
the Committee's enforcement power was an unconstitutional infringement
based on Guidry, Buckley, and Guste, and under the analysis presented
in the opinion by the attorney general. The opinion on second rehearing
cites little authority other than the constitutional provisions, which are
quite broad. Guste is cited for the proposition that the focus of the
constitutional determination is on the degree of control over the ap-
pointees contained in the particular statutory scheme under review. 49 But
Green III does not address other dicta in Guste which, if followed,
would have rendered the enforcement provisions unconstitutional. 0
The procedural history of Green also weakens its value. Justice Ad
Hoc Hall, who wrote the Green II opinion, was sitting in place of
Justice Lemmon. Justices Marcus, Watson, and Cole signed the majority
opinion; and Justices Dixon, Calogero, and Dennis dissented. When
rehearing was granted, Justice Lemmon had returned and Justice Hall
had not yet replaced Justice Dixon. Rehearing was granted by Justices
Dixon, Calogero, Dennis, and Lemmon. The opinion on rehearing was
written by Justice Lemmon, with Justices Dixon, Calogero, and Dennis
joining the majority, and Justices Marcus, Watson, and Cole dissenting.
When a second rehearing was denied, Justice Hall had replaced Justice
Dixon, but he voted against a second rehearing. At a minimum, this
procedural tennis weakens the opinion's value as a firm statement of
the supreme court.
Another infirmity in the court's decision lies in the holding, which
appears to contradict the reasoning in the opinion. The court states that
49. Id. at 625.
50. The principle of Buckley v. Valeo would invalidate a statute creating a
committee to perform functions exclusively executive when the legislature
named the members of the committee. Here, R.S. 39:311 names four
legislators as ex-officio members of the committee. The Attorney General,
however, does not attack the statute for this reason. R.S. 39:311, by the
terms of Act 538 of 1976, will be ineffective after March 10, 1980, whenA, a new section, R.S. 24:651, becomes effective, providing for a joint
legislative committee on the budget, composed of the House Appropri-
ations Committee and the Senate Finance Committee.
Guste v. Legislative Budget Comm., 347 So. 2d 160, 164 n.5 (La. 1977).
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the legislature exercised power belonging to the executive branch .5 The
exact language states:
We accordingly conclude that Louisiana Revised Statutes An-
notated 18:1511.5 does not unconstitutionally infringe on Louis-
iana Constitutional Article II, Section 2's prohibition against the
Legislature's exercising power belonging to the executive branch
and does not significantly unbalance the equilibrium sought to
be established by the constitutional allocation of powers among
the various branches of government.5
2
The interpretation of the first circuit and subsequent validation of
that interpretation establish that the legislature did not exercise power
belonging to the executive by making appointments to executive boards
or commissions. Residual power to make appointments was reserved to
the legislature in the appointments clause-the clause is a limitation on
the power of the governor rather than a limitation on the power of the
legislature. Nevertheless, the language of the holding is framed in terms
of the legislature exercising power which belongs to the executive branch.
If the power truly belongs to the executive branch, then usurpation of
that power by the legislature infringes on the doctrine of separation of
powers. This interpretation, even if incorrect, at a minimum illustrates
the ambiguity in the language used by the court.
Thus arises another problem with the holding: the statement that
the exercise of the executive power by the legislature is not violative if
is it does not "significantly unbalance" the constitution. The supreme
court appears to be saying the doctrine is not undermined or compro-
mised if it is not infringed upon very much. Constitutions by nature
are general documents, interpreted by the courts. Interpretations build
on one another like bricks. In its holding, the court has opened a door
to significantly unbalance the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers.
The underlying rationale of the doctrine is undermined by blurring
the lines between which branch can exercise what power, with no guide-
lines for when or why such blurring is necessary. If the legislature is
exercising power belonging to the executive, then the action should be
absolutely unconstitutional. Administrative agencies within limits may
issue regulations without infringing on the legislative power to make
laws. The judiciary has inherent powers of administration. Such powers,
although technically "belonging" to another branch, are necessary for
efficient functioning of government. The supreme court provides no





reason why it is necessary or beneficial to allow legislatively-appointed
boards executive power to enforce laws. Allowing the legislature to usurp
the executive power in little steps erodes the fundamental policies un-
derlying separation of powers, such as preventing autocratic government
and providing for checks and balances.
Furthermore, the view that legislative appointees are not under the
control of the legislature after appointment is unrealistic. In general,
the legislature, since each member must be elected and re-elected, has
an interest in not appointing anyone to the Board of Ethics who might
cause problems for legislators in their future actions. Because the Board
sits as the Committee, if its members maintain any kind of allegiance
or loyalty to the legislature or particular legislators from whom they
obtained appointment, the integrity of the Board is compromised. And
while the appointees cannot be legislators or their staff or family mem-
bers, these appointees could be friends, business or law partners, or
other allies of the legislator who nominates them. Specific actions taken
by the Committee also may be influenced. The independence of the
Board as a whole could be compromised by the loyalties of these
appointees, and the whole purpose of the Board of Ethics and the
Committee would be undermined. Notably, the governor's power to
appoint a member to the Board is much more restricted than the
appointive power of the legislature. The gubernatorial appointee must
be a retired or former Louisiana justice or judge. The governor also is
allowed only one appointee, whereas the legislature is allowed four.
Thus, the power of appointment between the legislature and the governor
is far from equal, nor is the possibility of control "dissipated by the
spreading of the appointive powers." 53
IV. CONCLUSION
The Louisiana Supreme Court on rehearing appears to have slashed
a hole in the doctrine of separation of powers which can only become
wider in the future. At the least the court has showf how the governor's
influence in the appointments area may be reduced. It has allowed the
legislature to usurp the executive power without justification. The original
opinion kept the issue framed more clearly: was the separation of powers
doctrine violated? Based on prior jurisprudence interpreting the state
constitutional provisions at issue, the court concluded it was. On re-
hearing, the court did not state why it found its original rationale to
be wrong. It only stated that after reconsideration, it reached a different
result. The different result appears to be that as long as the constitution
is not "significantly unbalanced," it can be violated. In the final analysis,
53. 566 So. 2d at 626.
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the supreme court may have usurped power from the executive branch
for itself. What used to be a clearly delineated line-that legislatively-
appointed boards could not constitutionally have civil enforcement power-
has been obliterated in favor of a case-by-case determination of whether
the degree of control significantly imbalances the constitution. Regardless
of who took the power, the executive branch has been robbed. This
holding undermines the doctrine of separation of powers and erodes the
principles on which these provisions are based.
Elizabeth Vaughan Baker
